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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
'
LEONE M. EVANS, RALPH EVANS,
BERNICE EVANS STUART, and
BETH EJVANS JOHNSON,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

10400

-vs.CL~~N

Case No.

8. STUART,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPO,NDENTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the surviving widow and children
of Hugh Alva Evans, deceased, for damage sustained by
Plaintiff8 by reason of the wrongfui death of said deredent caused by the negligent acts of the Defendant
m connection with starting and maintaining a fire on
Defendant'8 farm in Davis County, Utah, on March 7,
19()3.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
'l'Jw case was tried before the Honorable Charles G.
( «l\vley, sitting without a jury, following which the Court
1
,ntPrrd judgment on April 20, 1965, in favor of Plain1

tiffs and against Defendant for the sum of $9,000.00 general damages, $870.55 special damages and Plaintiff8 '
costs.
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial was thereafter
denied.
RELJE~-,

80UGHT ON APPEAL

The principal issue in connection with this appeal
is whether the evidence supports the finding of the Court
that Defendant was negligent, proximately cam.;ing the
death of Hugh Alva Evans, and that the decedent was
not contributorily negligent nor did he assume tlH• risk
of being burned in connection with his activities. Defendant further claims the award was excessive and given
under the influence of passion.

STATEMJ~NT

OF FACTS

Defendant was the only person available at thP
trial who was an eye witness to what occurred. For this
reason he was called by the Plaintiffs as an adversP
party for interrogation under the provisions of Rnk
43(b) U.R.C.P.
Although Defendant has endeavored to set forth the
facts in his Brief, they appear to reflect somewhat De·
fendant's views as to the inferences he would like to draw
thf>refrom rathn than the facts as found by the Court.
For this reason Plaintiffs submit the following additional
facts which appear in the record, as tf>stified to by tl11'
Defendant:
2

The winter pn•ceding l\[arch 7, 1963 (the day on
,,·Jiieh tht> fire occurred) had been very dry. The wheat
chaff and stubble had been left on the field along with
a nPw growth of alfalfa which had grown about a foot and
Jiad not been f t>d off. All of this was very dry and
brittle and highly flammable on .March 7, 1963. (Tr. 2±,
23) Hugh Alva I~vans came to work for the Defendant
about 1 :00 p.m. on March 7th and Yrns assigned by Defendant to take out a fence at the bottom of the field.
(Tr. 25 - See, also, Exhibit A) ·while decedent was
thus working on the fence, Defendant told him to start
a fire so that Defendant could burn out the ditch. (Tr.
27) Deceased told Defendant there was a little breeze
blowing, and Defendant realized that the wind was variable and at that time of the year likely to change at
any IllOUH>nt. (Tr. 48)
Tlw dPeeasPd started the fire as directed by Defendant and then went back to work on the fence, and Defendant uncll:'rtook to keep the fire under control and
lPt it burn where he wanted it to. (Tr. 30, 50) The fire
~tartPd to spread a little into some light stubble so
Defendant went back to his corral and got his small
tractor to help control it. He returned and put out the
fire which had started into the light stubble, but allowed
it to burn along the ditch bank. (Tr. 30) Defendant did
not want the fire to spread out into the area of the
lwavy alfalfa stubble (See Exhibit A) and knew that
if it did kn it would be hard to control. ('Tr. 31) He,
thPrdon', continued to watch
it ' sittinoon his small
.
b
t rnrtor without tlw engine running, while the fire burned
along thP ditch bank approaching a corner of the field
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where he was located. It took about fifteen to twenty
minutes for the fire to reach the corner of the field
where he intended to extinguish it. Although he had not
checked the gasoline in the tractor for several days, he
did not check it during this period of time. (Tr. 32, 3:-n
When the fire reached the corm~r where Defendant
was located, it started to spread out into the stubble so
he started the tractor and began to check it from spreading and had gone about twenty feet along the ditcl1 bank
when that tractor ran out of gas. Defendant then called
to Rex Terkelson (another helper in the field) to take
the pickup truck and go back to the yard for gasoline
while Defendant kept the fire from catching on to the
small tractor. He was successful in keeping the fire
from burning the small tractor, but it spread out into
the field, and as the wind changed it began spreading
rapidly. (Tr. 35) Defendant was well aware that it "·as
at that time of the year when they wer(l subject to quite
a bit of wind. (Tr. 35)
The fire spread out over a wide area as indicated hy
the Defendant on Exhibit A and proceeded up toward
the home and gas tanks belonging to Defendant's son,
Deon Stuart. The flames were from one to three feet
in heighth; and Defendant was quite concernPd and hollered to Terkelson as he was returning with gasoline to
get Mr. Evans and some shovels. Mr. Terkelson did so,
and he and Evans rod(' up toward the house in the pickup
truck along a roadway on the south side of the field.
(Tr. 37, 38) Defendant put some gasoline in his tractor,
drove around the rear of the fire where he lPft thP
4

tractor, an<l ran to the gas tanks. When he got there the
fire wa8 quite close to the tanks. (Tr. 39) All three
took shovels and proceeded to try to put the fire out
and hold it from being right up around the tanks. (Tr.
-i:2)

In the mean time the fire had spread around the
area of the home and a pile of lumber a few feet to the
west so Defendant sent Evans over to the lumber pile
telling him that Defendant Terkelson would be along
in a few minutes. (Tr. 43, 44) In a minute or two he
heard Evans call for help and called back that they would
be there in a minute or two. Defendant then thought the
fire was getting into the lumber. (Tr. 44) Defendant
and Terkelson continued to work around the pumps to
keep the fire from them; and he again heard deceased
call for help so he sent Terkelson, but when deceased
called for help the third time Defendant looked up and
saw deceased on fire and rolling in the dirt. (Tr. 45,
-16) Deceased was wearing some greasy coveralls belonging to Defendant which Defendant had told him to
put on that afternoon. (Tr. 47) Defendant knew that the
weather \rns unstable at that time of the year and that
the wind was likely to change from one moment to the
next. In fact it had increased considerably from the
timP the fire was first started up to the time it spread
into the stubble \Vhen the tractor ran out of gas. (Tr. 48,

3+)

On cross-Pxamination by his own counsel Defendant
w:is asked whetlwr he felt the day of the accident was a
~af 1 , day to burn and he answered. "Well, I suppose I
5

did or I wouldn't have had the fire startPtl. But it
probably wasn't." (Tr. 53) Defendant had no intention
of permitting the fire to burn in the area near the home
or the improvements because it was too dangerous. (Tr.
57) At the hospital afterwards he talked to decedent
and asked him how he figured he got on fire, ''and he
didn't know, unless there was fire behind him in the
lumber or in the grass, and stuff that was behind in the
lumber, you sel', or in the ('dges of the lumber." (Tr. 59)
Following the introduction of Plaintiff's evidence at
the trial Defendant moved for a dismissal, which Motion
was taken under advisement by the Court. rrhereupon
the Defendant rested without offering any testimony.
Following a brief argument by counsel for the respective parties, the Court took the matter under advisement. Subsequently briefs were submitted by the
respective parties and the Court later rendered its decision in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Dt>f endant.
The Court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and entered judgment on April 19, 1965, following
which Defendant moved for a new trial \Vhich, after
argument thereon, was denied by the Court.

ARGUl\IENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFFS.

6

BPcause Appellants have referred to the parties
as Plaintiffs and Defendant in his Brief, Respondents
\rill lik1•wisP use such designation of the parties.

Defendant in his Brief had subdivided this Argument
into three topics - in each of which the claim is made
that the evidence does not support the findings of the
trial eourt. Before proceeding to a discussion of each of
Defendant's sub-topics, we call the court's attention to
it:" numerous decisions in which it was held that in considering the soundness of the trial court's conclusion
and judgment, "certain cardinal rules must be kept in
mind: that the judgment is endowed with a presumption
of validity; that the party attacking it has the burden
of affirmatively showing that is in in error; and that
the evidence and all inferences that fairly and reasonably
may he drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light
most favorable to it." (Cheney v. Rucker, 14 U. 2d 205,
381P.2d86). See, also, Charlton v. Hackett, 11 U. 2d 389,
P. 2d 17G; Morris v. Christensen, 11 U. 2d 140, 356 P.2d
3-1-; Beehive Security Company v. Bush, 16 U. 2d 328, 400
P.2d 50G.
A. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT.

In claiming that he was not negligent, Defendant
relies upon his interpretation of the evidence as set forth
in his Brief. However, the evidence, as reviewed hereinahov<> and as apparently accepted by the court, clearly
Pstabfo;Jw::; negligent conduct on the part of the Defendant. The 0vidence is undisputed that decedent (while
1
nirkin.!t as an employee of Defendant) was engaged in
7

removing a fence at the lower end of Defendant's fil'ld
when he was asked by Defendant to start the fire. (Tr.
25) At that time he advised Defendant that it was somewhat windy, ('11 r. 48) but nevertheless proceeded to carry
out the order of his employer who took over the responsibility for maintaining and controlling the fire while
decedent went back to his work on the fence. (Tr. 30, 50)
Although the fire was initially started for the purpose
of burning weeds and brush in a very limited area, Defendant allowed it to spread up the ditch bank with the
idea in mind that he would control it at the time it
reached a corner of the field. He was unable to do so
because the tractor he intended to use to control the
fire ran out of gas so that the fire spr0ad across the
field and up near the home and gasoline pumps of Defendant's son, who was also the son-in-law of the decedent.
It was Defendant who required the decedent to join him
in attempting to control the fire (Tr. 37); and it was
Defendant -who sent the decedent around to the rear of
the home to keep the fire from the pile of lumber. (Tr.
43) Even after the decedent called for help twice Defendant ignored the call until after the third call wlwn
he observed the decedl"nt's clothing burning. (Tr. 45, 46)
Defendant even admitted that he was aware of the
weather conditions, of the dry and flan1mable natme of
the stubble in the field and of the variable winds blowing
the particular day in March when the fire occurred.
(Tr. 48) Under such circumstances there appears to lw
no question of the negligence of the Defendant. In fa et,
we believe the evidence discloses the Defendant wai'
negligent as a matter of law.

8

This court has heretofore set out the criterion to be
applied in determining whether the issue of negligence
is to he determined by the trier of fact. In Best v. Huber,
3 U. 2d 177, 281 P. 2d 208 the following rule was reaffirmed:
"It has been frequently announced by this
court that negligence is a question for the jury
unless all reasonable men must dra.w the same
conclusion from the facts as they are shown.
Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah 46, 234
P. 300, 38 A.L.R. 1523; Lowe v. Salt Lake City,
13 Utah 91, 44 P. 1050, 57 Am. St. Rep. 708; Baker
v. Decker, 117 Utah 15, ·212 P.2d 679. As was
said in Linden v. Anchor Min. Co., 20 Utah 134,
58 P. 355, 358:
" 'Where there is uncertainty as to the existence of either negligence or contributory negligence, the question is not the one of law, but of
fact, and to be settled by a jury; and this whether,
the uncertainty arises from a conflict in the testimony, or because, the facts being undisputed,
fair-minded men will honestly draw different conclusions from them.' "
In the earlier case of M orby v. Rogers, 122 Ut. 15, 252
P.2d 2:-n the court discussed the nature of the evidence

which might be used to establish negligent conduct. We
quote:

"It is not a new or novel principle that acts of
negligence may be proved by circumstances. Certainly, in many cases, particularly where the only
eye witnesses are parties having an interest in
the action, such circumstances are the only means
by which certain facts may be discussed. In such
cases it is proper that such circumstances should
be evaluated by the jury in whose province lies
9

the power to believe or disbelieve the testimony
and evidence, to observe the d{'meanor of the
witnesses, and to draw such reasonable conclusions from the whole record as may be warranted."
See, also Sandberg 1'. Cai:anaugh Timber Co., 95 Wn.
55G, 16-! Pac. 200, where, in an action for damages from
destruction of property by fire the Supr{'me Court affirmed the following instruction to the jury:

"It was the duty of the defendant to exercise
that care and diligence which a person of ordinary
prudence would exercise to extinguish or control
any fire started by it upon its premises and to
protect the property of plaintiff against loss on
account thereof, in view of the nature and extent
of the fire, the material on the ground, the weather
conditions prevailing, the means at hand, and all
the surrounding circumstances, and the failure of
the defendant to exercise such reasonable care
would be and constitute negligence upon its part."
'Ve submit that the evidence in this ease is more
than adequate to sustain a finding that Defendant was
negligent proximatPly ea using the death of Hugh Alva
Evans.
B. and C.
DECEDENT'S ALLEGED CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK.

What has been said above applies equally as well
on the issue of contributory negligence and assumption
of ri8k. As stated by this court in the ease of Ra:i/ 1"
Consolidated Freightways, 4 U. 2d 137, 289 P.2d 196:
''At the outset the mind of the fact trier is
presumably in equipoise on the questio.n of
whether the plaintiff was contributorily nPghgent.
10

'l'he burden is upon the defendant to overcome this
balance and to impel his mind toward a conclusion.
lf no evidence is presented, the burden is not
met, and the finding is that the plaintiff was not
guilty of contributory negligence; likewise, if the
evidence is insufficient to convince by a prepondl•rance of the evidence, the finding is that the
plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence.
8uch finding, therefore, may be based either on
an entire lack of evidence, or upon insufficient
evidence. Obviously, it is not necessary that such
finding he supported by 'substantial evidence.'
'l'herefore, if there is any reasonable basis, either
because of the lack of evidence, or from the evidence and the fair inferences to he derived therefrom, taken in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, upon which any reasonable mind could
conclude that is was not convinced by a perponderance of the evidence either (a) that the plaintiff
was guilty or contributory negligent or (b) that
such negligence proximately contributed to cause
the injury, then the refusal of the trial court to
find plaintiff contributorily negligent must he sustained. It would only be when such refusal did
such violence to common sense as to convince the
<'ourt that no fact trier, acting fairly and reasonably, would refuse to make such finding, that it
would be reversed."
In Glemi v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 1 U. 2d 308, 265
P.2d 101~, this court held that where more than one
inference can be drawn as to what a reasonably prudent
llla11 would do under th€' circumstances the question of
(·ontrihutory negligence is for the trier of the fact. See,
also, Baker v. Decker, 117 U. 15, 212 P.2d 679.
Def Pndant has cited several cas€'s from other jurisdidion:-; in :-;upport of his contention that decedt•nt was
11

guilty of contributory negligence. \Ye submit that not
one of these cases is in point. Neither of these cases
involves a fire or a situation where the relationship of
employer-employee exists. Under circumstances similar
to these involved in the instant matter the law is well
settled-that the matter of negligence, contributory negligence, or assumption of risk is one for the trier of tl11·
fact. As stated in 22 Am. Jur. FIRES, Section 40:
"One whose property is exposed to danger by
fire by another's negligence or wrongful act is
justified, whether or not he is bound, to make such
an effort as an ordinarily prudent person would
make to save it or prevent damages to it. If in
so doing, and while exercising such care for his
safety as is reasonable and prudent under thP
circumstances, he is injured as a result of the
negligence against the effort of which he is seeking to protect his property, the wrongdoer whose
negligence is the occasion of the injury must respond for the damages. In many cases, no distinction is made as to the ownership of the property
in danger. If the attempt to save the property
is not deemed, in and of itself, the proximafr
cause of the injuries, the mere fact that the property belonged to some person other than the plaintiff will not of itself prevent a recovery."
An extensive annotation on this subject is contained
in 42 ALR 2d commencing at page 488. The case therP
annotated is St. Louis-San Francisco R. R. Co. 'L Gi1111
(Okla. 1953) 264 P.2d 351. The syllabus of that case,
as prepared by the Court, reads as follows :
"\Vhere a railroad company negligently caused a fire, on its right of way, which endangered
plaintiff's meadow and plaintiff took his tractor
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and plowed a fire guard around his meadow in
an attempt to minimize the damage from the fire
and then, when taking the tractor to a place of
i.;afety, he ran over a root or branch which flew up,
striking and injuring his eye, he can recover damages for the injury, from said railroad company,
provided he did not act unreasonably or recklessly
and was not guilty of contributory negligence."
In the Ginn case the Court stated that there was no
question hut that the fire was started by one of the def Pndant's trains. The position and contention of the
Defendant, however, was that the accident and injury
was not caused by the setting of the fire since the plaintiff was injured in the operation of his tractor in attempting to prevent the fire from spreading. In analyzing this
contention the Court stated that the plaintiff was requirPd to use reasonahle means to arrest the fire and
pn~vent loss.
"He cannot stand idly by and permit the loss
to increase and then hold the wrongdoer liable
for the loss which he might have prevented. It is
only incumhent on him, however, to use reasonable exertion and reasonable expense, and the
question in such case is always whether the act
was a reasonable one, having a regard to all of
the circumstances in the case."
The <'ourt went on to say that the plaintiff in that
<'U:->P ''was not in the place of injury by his own volition.
lf p wu:;; not engaged in an act of his own choosing. He
was di:-<<'harging a duty owned by him to the defendant
to minimize the loss ' and this b"J reason of defendant's
own nPgligen<'P. Ji~quitably, plaintiff should not be re,:ni red to lwar the loss resulting from his personal injur-

13

ies. Legally, the majority view is that the injuries flow
from the fire rather than indepenrlently from the diseharge of a duty imposed by the fire."
While the annotation in 42 ALR 2d, page -l-88 doe~
not cover the situation in which an employee is injured,
it does review all of the other circumstances which an·
present in the instant cast>. As stated at page 50D of
the annotation:
"Where the plaintiff received personal injuries while attempting to protect or save another
person's property from a fire, the courts have held
that the one who negligently caused such fire i~
liable for the injuries suffered."
vVith reference to the employer-employee situation,
35 Am. Jur. MASTER AND SERVANT, Section 320
states the following:
"Another exception to the rule of assumption
of risk incident to employment is that servant does
not assume the risk of injury incident to his employment when the work is being done under the
command, order, and immediate direction and
control of the employer or his representative.
Where such evidence is produced, the issue as to
responsibility or assumption of risk is held, onlinarily, to be one which is properly submitted to
the jury.
It is the duty of an employee to sulmiit hi111self to the reasonable demands of his employn.
not only as to the work to be done, but as to the
manner of doing it, and it is his right to w;sume
that his employer will take the necessary p-n:ca.1 1tions to secure safety and will not expose lum
to wmecessary danger. This obedience a11 f'/11-

14

ployee properly may accord even where he is
confronted with perils that otheru·ise should be
avoided. In any case, but more plainly where a
command is sud.den and there is little or no time
for reflection and deliberation, the employee may
not set up his judgment against that of his recognized superiors; on the contrary, he may rely
upon their advice, assurances, and commands, notwithstanding marny misgivings of his own. It by
no means follows that because he could justify
disobedience of the order, he is barred of recovery
f'or injuries received in obeying it. He is not
required to balance the degree of danger and decide whether it is safe for him to act, on the contrary, he is relieved in a measure of the usual
obligation of exercising vigilamce to detect and
avoid the danger." (Emphasis added.)
A rt-'cPnt case directly in point of this subject is the

ease of Nissula v. Southern Idaho Timber Protective
Asseociation, 73 Ida. 37, 245 P.2d 400. In the Nissula
easr the vla.intiff owned a D-7 catervillar tractor, which
he used in logging operations. On August 28, 1949 a
forest fire was reported near the plaintiff's operations.
The plaintiff volunteered the use of his men and equipnwnt and was directed by an agent of the defendant (the
<lef!'ndant being in charge of the operations against the
fin•) to take his tractor to the fire. The defendant compi·n:-;ah·d plaintiff for the use of the tractor on a regular
lionrl.'· rati•. Plaintiff was directed to take his tractor
clp a mountainside to push the brush back and dig a trench
111 pr1>w11t the :-;p1·eading of the fire. He followed the
t 1 ad u r all(] its 01wrator and after observing that "it
irn;-; prPtt~· J'O<'k.Y up there'' stopped the driver and retmn1·d and con1plai1wd to t1H-' ::mpervisor that it was
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not a fit place in which to operate the tractor. Thr·
tractor was then returned to safer ground, hut suhHPquently as the fire became more intense the defendant'H
supervisor directed the operator to return the cah~rpillar
to the mountain at which time, while engaged in clearing
brush, it became lodged against a stump and exposed to
sudden flareup of the fire so that it had to be abandoned
by the driver and was severely damaged by the fire. At
the conclusion of the evidence Defendant moved for a
directed verdict which was granted by the trial court.
However, the Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the low!'r
court, holding that the issue of contributory negligencP
or assumption of risk should have been submitted to thl'
jury. \Ve quote from the Court's opinion as follows:
"The operator had been directed to take
orders from Cross and there is evidence that in
going up on the hillside the second time and in
pushing brush and dirt at the point where thr
tractor became stalled, he acted upon specific
directions from Cross. As to such acts he was
under the control of, and was as to such acts the
servant of, the defendant, although at the same
time he was the servant of the owner in the manipulation of the machine itself. 1 Restatement of
Agency Sec. 2'l7. So if, under the circumstances,
it was negligent to direct the operator to take the
tractor up on the hillside and to push brush and
dirt in the manner done, and the damage proximately resulted therefrom, then the d(:'f endant
would be liable. These were questions of fact for
jury."
On the matter of assumption of risk the Court further said:
"As to defendant's contention that the risk~
incident to this use of the tractor were assuroed
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by tlw plaintiff, it need only be said that one
doe:-; not a8sume risks which he does not consent to
assume and which are imposed upon him against
his will. 56 C.J.S., Master & Servant, Sec. 357;
;35 Am. J ur., l\faster & Servant, Sec. 320. The
plaintiff protested against the use of his tractor
upon the steep hillside and testified he had an
understanding with Roberts that it would not be
so used. As to whether that applied to the area
where the tractor was burned, the evidence is not
clear, but it is sufficient to say that it does not
justify the conclusion that the plaintiff assumed
the risks involved."
ThP Comt also found that whether the driver of the
tractor was guitly of eontrilmtory negligence wa8 a question for thP jury.
See, also, RPction 7G-24-1, Utah Code Annotated,
19a3 wl1ich makPs it a misdemeanor negligently or wilfully to exposP another's property to damage of destruction by fin'.
POINT II
THE JUDGl\IENT WAS NOT EXCESSIVE OR BASED
UPON PASSION.

l t is hard to sPe how the trial court could be accused
1' lwing- influeneed by passion in making his award to
l'laintiffs for tlw wrongful death of the husband and
father. 1'he case was tried on December 17, 1964, after
1rhieh it was takf'n under advisement. (R. 23) Briefs were
11
' lirnittPd h~· the rPspectiw parties; and the Court there'•t'h r 1·1H!PrPd its dPcision on ::\fareh 26, 1965, more than
t lil·•·(· 111onths later. ( R. :3!))

0
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Although Defrndant's brief makes sorne gt>rn•ral
statement to tlw ('ffoct that decf'dPnt was ''not prrnluetive," th<' fact is that he wa:.; earning the lllaximurn h\·
was allowed to earn while drawing social security. .\(·cording to tlw undisputed testimony the decedPnt \\a~
earning approximakly $100.00 per month, (Tr. 9:3) all
of which inconw was lost hy his untimely death. In addition, the Social Security benefits were n•ducecl h:-· $:i:l.(111
per month and the Vett•ran's benefits by another $:30.00
per month, (Tr. 102) making a total loss of inco111P nf
at ll'ast $185.00 per month. On the other hand, tlw only
expenses which have been eliminated by tlw death of i\lr.
Evans were his food evpense of about $25.00 a month and
his personal and elothing t>xpense of approximah·ly
anotlwr $15.00 per month (Tr. 108) so that tlw suryiving
widow has suffered a rwcuniary loss hy reaf.'on of hi,;
death of approximately $150.00 per month. SineP )lr.
Evans' life expectancy was in excess of 1:2 y<"ars, th(·
total loss from this source alone would be $18,000.0il.
However, this does not com1wnsate for all of tlw In~'
sustained, including the loss of comfort, society, companionship, and assistance, both to the surviYing wido11
and the adult children who an• Plaintiffs in thi;:,; action.
Again, the Court has established the criterion foi
dt>terrnining whether a wrdict of a jury will lw :·wt a,icll'
as being eXC'l'ssivf' and a result of passion or pn·.inili•·( ·
In the case of Pauly r. McCart71y, 109 Ft. +:n. 1~+ l'.~':l
123, tlw Court stah>d that "the jury is allmY<'rl a ,c;Ti·:d
latitudt> in assessing damagPs for pt>r~onal in,juriP~.··
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On ttH•

is~1w

of sPtting aside the verdict it held that:

"tlw facts must be such that the excess can be
<l(·terrnined as a matter of law, or the verdict must
1-w so !:'Xcessive as to be shocking to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice,
or rorruption on the part of the jury."

CONCLUSION
WP submit that the :B,indings of Fact, Conclusions
nf Law, and .Judgment are supported by the evidence and
~i10uld be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted

ARTHUR H. NIELSEN

Nielsen, Conder and Hansen
510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondents
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